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The chapter considers three Czech parties that display populist features: the ruling party ANO and 
two non-governmental parties, Freedom and Direct Democracy and the Communist Party of Bohemia 
and Moravia. In our text we first explain the broader political context, the spread of COVID-19 and 
the political measures to address the virus in the Czech Republic. It looks at the populist discourse of 
the three parties and, finally, their strategies of (de)politicisation regarding the COVID-19 issue. The 
chapter shows that the COVID-19 epidemy has not yet transformed their rhetoric but has brought to 
light its most important features. In the case of ANO especially, there was a strong tendency to try to 
depoliticise the issue by involving experts and especially epidemiologists in the discussion. 
 
ONDŘEJ CÍSAŘ, Charles University, Prague 




Populism has become a ‘new and ubiquitous dimension of politics’ (Zanatta, 2013) and we may very 
well be living in the ‘epoch of populism’ (Liogier, 2013). This is not just a general argument; it also 
applies to the contemporary Czech Republic, where, after being on the margins, it became part of the 
political mainstream after 2015 (Císař & Štětka, 2017). Our chapter considers three parties that 
display populist features: the ruling party ANO 2011 (ANO) and two non-governmental parties, 
Freedom and Direct Democracy (Svoboda a přímá demokracie – SPD) and the Communist Party of 
Bohemia and Moravia (Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy – KSČM), which nevertheless both often 
back the government in the parliament, KSČM officially. Embodying different faces of populism, all 
three represent different versions of what the mainstream literature labels as populist parties. This 
chapter shows that the current crisis has not yet transformed their rhetoric but has brought to light its 
most important features. In our text we first explain the broader political context, the spread of 
COVID-19 and the political measures to address the virus in the Czech Republic. It looks at the 
populist discourse of the three parties and, finally, their strategies of (de)politicisation regarding the 
COVID-19 issue. In the case of ANO especially, there was a strong tendency to try to depoliticise the 
issue by involving experts and especially epidemiologists in the discussion. 
 
 
1. Political Context 
The most successful Czech populist party has been the ANO party. It was established in 2011–2012 
and enjoyed a fair amount of success from early on. In the 2013 parliamentary elections ANO gained 
18.65% of the votes and 23.5% of the seats.38 The movement became part of the government of the 
Social Democrats, while its founder, sponsor, and unquestioned leader, Andrej Babiš, a billionaire 
entrepreneur, became Minister of Finance. ANO won the subsequent 2017 parliamentary elections, 
receiving 29.64% of the votes and 39% of the seats, and became the dominant party. It is then that 
Babiš, winner of the elections, became Prime Minister.  
The second populist party – the SPD – was formed in 2015. It was founded by a Czech-Japanese 
businessman, Tomio Okamura, who had previously disbanded his first party, Dawn of Direct 
Democracy (Úsvit přímé demokracie – ÚPD). To some extent, Okamura established his second 
movement ‘just in time,’ in that the immigrant crisis had just started to flare, and that mobilised not 
only the SPD but the whole populist political scene (Císař & Navrátil 2019). In the parliamentary 
 
38 The source of this and following electoral data is the Czech Statistical Office  
 
 
elections of 2017, SPD entered the Chamber of Deputies with 10.64% of the votes and 11% of the 
seats. 
What binds and what differentiates these two populist parties? ANO is an ‘extreme form of a 
business-firm party’ (Kopeček, 2016), which is heavily dependent on its leader (Kubát & Hartliński 
2019). It was established at the initiative of its leader as a kind of ‘personal vehicle’ (Lucardie, 2000) 
that serves the leader as a means of fulfilling his ambitions and needs. Whilst SPD is also a business-
firm party, it is not as much a business-firm party as ANO is. Both parties present themselves as anti-
establishment and anti-elitist and focus on the alleged ubiquitousnous of political corruption. While 
they have many shared features, the two parties are not identical. While ANO represents an anti-
political (rejecting ‘traditional corrupted parties’) and technocratic or expert form of populism 
(‘experts’ should rule instead of ‘incompetent politicians’), SPD is clearly professing far-right 
nationalism and xenophobia (Balík et al., 2019; Císař & Navrátil 2019; Kopeček et al., 2018). 
KSČM represents a different case, both in terms of how the party was established and how it evolved 
in time, and in terms of its political identity and orientation. KSČM is the direct successor of the 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická strana Československa – KSČ), which was 
founded in 1921 and from 1948 to 1989 was the ruling hegemonic party in Czechoslovakia. After the 
fall of communism in 1989, the party changed its name but, in the end, failed to shed its Marxist-
Leninist identity. It never transformed itself into a non-communist socialist or social democratic party 
(Kunštát 2013). Nevertheless, KSČM has been the most stable Czech party since 1989. Its electoral 
support has long been around 10–15%, falling to 7.76% only in the last parliamentary elections in 
2017. KSČM has never directly participated in any governmental coalition since 1989; however, 
following the 2017 elections, it became part of a pro-government parliamentary alliance. 
KSČM can be described as a ‘non-exclusively populist party’ (Havlík & Pinková, 2012: 29), in which 
populism is accompanied by another clear set of ideological preferences, in this case vulgar Marxism-
Leninism. KSČM is a dogmatic Marxist-Leninist party, nostalgic for the ancient regime. It is an anti-
system party according to Sartori’s (1976: 138) narrow definition of the concept. But can it be 
classified as a populist party? While KSČM does not fulfil all the defining features of populism, from 
a longitudinal perspective we can detect strong social populism in its programme (Císař & Štětka, 
2019; Havlík, 2012) and that populism is linked to nationalism. It is a combination of social and 
national protest (Kubát, 2016). 
 
Table 8.1 Main Czech political parties (>5% in the last general election) 
Political party 2017 general election  2019 European election  
 Vote shares Seats Vote shares Seats 
In power     
ANO 29.64 78  21.18 6 
Communist Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia* 
7.76 15 6.94 1 
Czech Social Democratic Party 7.27 15 3.95 0 
In opposition      
Civic Democratic Party 11.32 25  14.54 4 
Czech Pirate Party 10.79 22 13.95 3 
Freedom and Direct Democracy 10.64 2 9.14 2 
Christian and Democratic Union – 
Czechoslovak People’s Party 
5.80 1 7.24 2  
 
TOP 09 5.31 7 11.65** 3** 
Mayors and Independents 5.18 6 
* Communist party is not a part of the cabinet, but it supports it in the parliament.  





2. COVID-19 diffusion and political measures 
News about the global spread of COVID-19 reached the Czech Republic before any individuals tested 
positive for the virus in the country. In the first ‘pre-COVID-19’ phase, for months the Czech media 
followed the situation in China and northern Italy, especially as the latter is a popular vacation spot 
for many Czechs. Despite the mounting information, the Czech government did not take any serious 
action until the country had its first positive cases on March 1, 2020.  
All the key measures that were supposed to slow down the spread of the COVID-19 were taken during 
March, when the second phase of the epidemic started. Initially, at the beginning of March, travel 
conditions were tightened and quarantine was introduced for Czech citizens returning from high-risk 
areas. On March 11, all schools were closed. The following day, the government declared a state of 
emergency, which, among other things, restricted free movement of people. Most shops and all 
restaurants were closed on March 14, the state borders were closed on March 16, and wearing masks 
in public was made mandatory on March 19.39 
The Czech Republic was ultimately only mildly impacted by the first wave of the epidemic (see figure 
8.1 and table 8.2), and most hospital emergency beds were never occupied. Therefore, after the 
country entered the third phase of the epidemic (the mitigation of contagion) early on, by April 14, 
2020, the government approved a five-stage plan, during which it gradually lifted most of the 
measures introduced earlier. Life in the country, with some exceptions, returned to a new normal. 
During the state of emergency, a number of problems, controversies, and discussions arose, three of 
which were the most noticeable. However, none of them globally posed a serious challenge to the 
government’s strategy to fight COVID-19. The first controversy emerged right at the beginning of 
the epidemic and was related to the purchase and distribution of medical protective equipment for 
health professionals. There was a lack of personal protective equipment and their distribution to 
medical and social facilities was both limited and disorganised. The situation with masks (or their 
lack of) was characteristic. Sewing masks at home and self-distributing them not only to family 
members and friends but also to nurses and doctors became a society-wide phenomenon.  
The issue of purchasing medical protective equipment also had a strong political line. While some 
countries, including Taiwan, donated personal protective equipment to the Czech Republic, the 
government bought most of it in China and at exorbitant prices. The opposition criticised the 
government on two accounts. First, for favouring expensive and opaquely transacted purchases from 
China over inciting Czech production. Second, for its responses, as, according to the opposition, the 
government showed devotion to China but failed to thank Taiwan enough.   
The second controversy, which mostly unfolded among different experts, revolved around what 
constituted appropriate epidemiological measures. The essence of the dispute was that the experts 
(epidemiologists, biologists, and other medical professionals) themselves disagreed on the most basic 
points: what caused the COVID-19, how dangerous COVID-19 really is, and whether we were in the 
midst of a pandemic or not. Related to this were the differing views of experts and also of the public 
on the country’s lockdown, and then also on the gradual lifting of restrictions. The critics of strict 
measures, mostly various types of experts, pointed out that the country’s lockdown would have far 
worse social and economic and ultimately health (neglecting preventive medical care) effects than 
the epidemic itself.  
Related to this is the economic impact of the crisis, which is the third central point around which 
debate has revolved. The government recently approved the highest budget deficit in the country’s 
history (up to CZK 500 billion)40 and the expected economic downturn is [and the economy is 
expected to shrink by] between 5.5 and 6.5%41 or even as much as 8%.42 The crisis has hit tourism 
and related areas (restaurants and pubs, hotel industry) the most, as well as the automobile industry, 
 
39 A list of all the measures taken by the Czech government is available on a special website set up by the Ministry of 
Health of the Czech Republic: https://koronavirus.mzcr.cz. 
40 Vláda schválila schodek rozpočtu 500 miliard. Novinky.cz, 8/06/2020. 
41 Skvělý rok Netflixu i obří ekonomický pokles. Projděte si rekordy kolem koronaviru. Aktualne.cz, 2/05/2020. 
42 European Commission. Economic and financial affairs website, Czech Republic. 
 
 
which is important for the Czech economy. The opposition disagreed with the measures that the 
government introduced to boost the economy. 
 
Figure 8.1 Daily death toll and new cases in Czech Republic 
 
Source: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
Phase 1: pre-Covid-19; Phase 2: spread and containment measures; Phase 3: contagion mitigation 
 
 
Table 8.2 COVID-19 pandemic in France 
Cases 9,787 
Total deaths 330 
Total recovered 7,111 
Cases for 1 M pop 914 
Deaths for 1 M pop 31 
Source: www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/ (update 10/6/2020) 
 
 
3. Populist discourse at the time of COVID-19  
In general, Czech political parties that display populist features have not transformed their rhetoric in 
their reaction to the COVID-19 crisis. There were no substantial changes in the discourse of Prime 
Minister Babiš and other representatives of his political organisation ANO. In fact, the same 
symbolism, slogans, and public displays of his direct relationship with the people and its immediate 
needs have been used during the COVID-19 crisis as were used before it. In fact, Babiš stressed that 
the crisis provided him with a real opportunity to actually put his signature slogan in practice. In an 
interview that he gave ten days after the state of emergency was declared, Babiš said: ‘We work 
twenty hours a day, now we are really running the country like a company, just as when there are 
floods or there is an accident in a chemical factory. So, online, with immediate decisions and 
implementation. We are now one family, so we run it like a family business with a population of 10.7 
million.’43 After the first wave of the crisis was over, Babiš repeated this stress on company-like 
effectiveness, his hard-working nature, and his direct and unmediated relationship with the people: 
‘The coronavirus changed the scope of work of the government and we ultimately managed it like a 
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family company, and it was effective, it was concrete, we saw our decisions in practice. I was at work 
from morning to night, it was crisis management and it’s continuing.’44  
Instead of changes, there were continuities and specific adaptations in Babiš’s communication style 
and discourse. Before the crisis, Babiš regularly stressed his relationship to the needs of ordinary 
and/or hard-working people. Unlike his predecessors, he would walk out to meet demonstrators in 
front of the Governmental Office or would personally visit a hackathon that was organised to protest 
a particular policy of his government and come up with an alternative IT solution. He stylised himself 
into the role of both a capable manager and the caring father of the nation, for which image he drew 
on the historical figure of ‘Jan Antonín Baťa, the interwar shoe magnate who had extensive (but never 
realised) plans in the 1930s to remake the country using management and business techniques’ 
(Hanley & Vachudova 2018: 282). Baťa is also remembered for his direct management methods and 
the programmes and benefits he introduced to support his employees. During the crisis, this political 
style was further applied when, for example, Babiš himself visited a food warehouse to check out the 
availability of basic food items for stores. The same pattern was in place when Babiš, with other 
members of his cabinet, personally welcomed a cargo plane full of masks and respirators from China 
at Prague airport.  
Babiš’s relationship to the European Union, or some of its institutions, is complicated and was so 
even before the crisis. Although ANO and Babiš support the EU in principle, and mostly as an 
important source of money for the Czech economy in general, and his holding company in particular, 
Babiš criticised the EU for its alleged lack of effectivity and capacity for action in the past, especially 
in relation to the proposals to introduce a permanent EU relocation mechanism as a solution to the 
2015 migration crisis. As early as the end of January 2020, he targeted the EU for its lack of activity 
in relation to the coming coronavirus crisis: ‘...unless something fundamental happens, because 
Europe isn’t being very active yet, I’ll suggest to the government on Monday that we temporarily ban 
all flights from China’.45 The EU and its policies have been criticised many times since then – for 
example, when Babiš did not want to support the proposed EU economic recovery plan.  
Our observation about the continuity of populist rhetoric also applies to Tomio Okamura’s nationalist 
and far-right SPD. The main target of this party’s rhetoric has been the EU, which, according to 
Okamura, failed in its response to the pandemic. The SPD alleged that the EU was unable to deal 
with the current crisis in the same way that it failed to cope with the 2015 migration crisis; in the 
party discourse the two crises are moreover connected to each other. In fact, according to SPD both 
crises are actively co-created by the EU, which is inviting migrants to the EU as well as forcing 
individual countries to be dependent on each other in terms of goods and especially food supply. This 
makes it difficult for individual countries to adequately deal with current challenges, including the 
COVID-19 crisis. The party sees food self-sufficiency as the ideal and in fact it wants the country’s 
agricultural and, as much as possible also, its economic system to be autarchic, which it contends is 
the only way to fight current global problems such as migration and the pandemic. In the view of the 
party: ‘The EU does not help, it does harm. The sooner we leave it, the better.’46 The party has actively 
utilised the COVID-19 crisis to advance its traditional political programme and its focal points such 
as fight against so-called ‘unadaptable’ people, or against support for what the party deems ‘political’ 
NGOs. It wants any public funding in these areas to be cut and redirected to those who really need 
the support. The same applies to public support for alternative sources of energy and the planned 
acquisition of military equipment, which should be stopped or postponed. 
KSČM has also continued its pre-crisis nationalist rhetoric. In general, as its Parliamentary supporter, 
the party was not very critical of the government, with the exception of what the communists saw as 
the possibly ‘endless’ extension of the state of emergency. Like the SPD, the party stressed the issue 
of self-sufficiency, concerning not only food but other strategic commodities as well. The party’s 
traditional fight against globalisation and internationalisation had, in its view, been made even more 
 
44 Koronavirus mi umožnil řídit stát jako rodinnou firmu, řekl Babiš. Idnes.cz, 7/05/2020 
45 Česko kvůli koronaviru rozšíří opatření na letištích. Česká televize, 30/01/2020 
46 SPD. See: https://spd.cz/eu-chce-pretvorit-evropske-instituce/ 
 
 
urgent by the pandemic. Therefore, a strong state, less international economic dependency, and more 
economic self-sufficiency have become even more important in recent times than before. KSČM also 
criticised the planned acquisition of military equipment, but mostly on the grounds that it would 
contribute to an upgrading of NATO, which is an established target for the party. In general, the 
international environment has represented a traditional source of threat for the party, which was again 
proven by the current crisis. The most important imperative remains the same as before the pandemic, 
i.e. not to lose sovereignty and to fight international capital: ‘Either developments will be directed in 
favour of foreign capital, which wants to concentrate more assets and its power in the crisis, or in 
favour of our citizens. By supporting further growth in wages and social benefits, despite the debt we 
are not relinquishing control of our economy to foreign capital at this stage.’47  
 
 
4. The politicization of the COVID-19 issue by populists  
As described above, in the first phase, the situation in China and Italy was covered by the Czech 
media and political actors. In the beginning, the media played an important role in setting the agenda 
of the COVID-19 issue. Regarding concrete measures, direct flights to China were discontinued as 
early as the beginning of February, more than a month before the start of the real confrontation phase. 
However, at the very same time, the Minister of Health (nominated by ANO), Adam Vojtěch, 
published an article that explicitly downplayed the seriousness of COVID-19, comparing it and its 
lethality to what he alleged to be the more dangerous ‘common’ flu and asking the public to calm 
down: ‘Let’s hope that the coronaviral and media hysteria will soon disappear, the public will realise 
that we are not in a [catastrophe] film, and we will return to earth. However, the coronavirus did 
yield one positive thing. People have begun to pay more attention to flu prevention, actually 
unwittingly.’48 The by now infamous article reiterated what official political representatives were 
stressing at that time, namely that the country was indeed prepared to deal with the infection should 
it eventually appear in the country. Only a couple of days before, on 28 January, Bohuslav Svoboda, 
a gynaecologist by profession, and a well-known politician and opposition MP from the Civic 
Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana – ODS), tried unsuccessfully to initiate a discussion 
in Parliament of COVID-19 and the country’s preparedness to cope with it. 
The confrontation phase started in mid-March. Since ANO is the governing and strongest party in the 
country, it was actually in the position to react to and solve the COVID-19 crisis. The measures were 
adopted in March (see above), based on information from countries already dealing with infections, 
especially Italy, and only after COVID-19 had arrived to the country. In terms of politicisation, we 
were actually able to observe the opposite trend in ANO’s discourse, as it attempted to de-politicise 
the issue by stressing the role played by experts, especially epidemiologists, in devising policy. 
Roman Prymula, the non-partisan deputy minister of care and also an epidemiologist, was originally 
appointed the head of the crisis management team, and politicians made repeated declarations of their 
reliance on expertise. When announcing the state of emergency, Babiš stressed: ‘For me, Mr Prymula 
and his team are the greatest experts. I’m constantly in touch with him, online. The World Health 
Organization woke up and said there is a pandemic, and Mr Prymula already told me this a week 
ago.’49 
Babiš repeatedly stressed that the decisions about what anti-COVID-19 measures were introduced 
were based entirely on the expert knowledge of epidemiologists, so much so that he even said that 
epidemiologists were the ones actually making the decisions at the peak of the crisis. Although 
Prymula resisted such claims, he did confirm that during the first two months of the pandemic 
epidemiologists had a big influence on decision-making and nobody questioned their 
 
47 KSČM. See: https://www.kscm.cz/cs/aktualne/aktuality/kscm-jedna-pri-krizi-konstruktivne 
48 Ministry of Health of the Czech Republic. See: http://www.mzcr.cz/dokumenty/ceska-koronaviralni-
chripka_18483_3693_1.html 
49 Řídí operaci, jakou Česko ještě nezažilo. Deník N, 18/03/2020. 
 
 
recommendations.50 Like some other countries, experts received considerable public support from 
the population in the midst of the crisis. There was also nearly unanimous political support for the 
government’s general anti-virus measures when they were introduced in March. No visible or 
substantial criticism from the opposition was formulated in this period; this only occurred later on 
and was directed at the government’s economic recovery plan and, before that, its strategy to acquire 
protective equipment mostly from China, but was not aimed at the government’s general measures to 
prevent COVID-19 from spreading in the country. 
The third phase started in mid-April, when the government approved a five-stage plan to gradually 
lift the anti-COVID-19 measures that had been introduced and started to discuss and propose 
measures to help the economy recover. At this stage, the debate focused on a number of issues relating 
to what types of measures should be introduced and what the adequate extent of these measures 
should be. These measures were introduced gradually and were often revised on the basis of 
opposition criticism. It is not our aim here to cover these debates in detail, but we can say that the 
main dispute was over the state’s fiscal strategy. Unlike the previous government and its strategy 
during the financial crisis, the current government has repeatedly rejected austerity policies and 
budget cuts, and, on the contrary, it intends to run an exceptionally big budget deficit in order to 
support public investment and pro-employment policies and to save the economy from a severe 
recession.  
Although there is no principal opposition to this strategy, the government has nevertheless been 
criticised for its unwillingness to find possible savings in state expenses. Another general critical 
argument concerns the lack of a more strategic plan on how to tackle the increased deficit and how 
to consolidate public finances in the future. Critics have pointed to the possible mismanagement of 
public funds. When the record budget deficit was approved in Parliament on June 8, the condition 
that KSČM presented to the government in exchange for its support was that the government prepare 
a plan for fiscal consolidation by the end of September 2020. 
A dispute over who was responsible for COVID-19 has been going on mostly outside the arena of 
party politics and rather on the Internet and social media since the beginning of the pandemic. There 
are analyses available that monitor the activities of disinformation webs spreading fake news about 
the fabricated nature of COVID-19 and singling out those who are supposedly responsible for it, 
whether it be the Chinese or US-based government actors. Out of the parties covered in this chapter, 
KSČM has probably come closest to entering this discussion in its attempt to clear China of possible 
responsibility for the pandemic: ‘The current historical turning point is caused by the so-called 
coronavirus pandemic, and all analysts are investigating whether it is an artificial problem or 
whether it is a problem that is really a part of society’s development, who is behind it, and how to 
evaluate it.’51 There is also an EMP from the SPD party who runs one of these disinformation webs, 




This chapter has reviewed and discussed the measures adopted by Czech political representatives and 
their discourse relating to COVID-19: the ruling ANO party and two non-governmental parties, SPD 
and the KSČM. All three represent different versions of what the mainstream literature labels as 
populist political parties. The chapter most importantly shows that the current crisis has not yet 
transformed their rhetoric, but has had the effect of amplifying the most important components of 
that rhetoric. For example, in the case of ANO, the managerial approach to governance has been 
discursively wielded as the single most important tool for fighting COVID-19. The chapter also 
distinguished three phases of action and discourse relating to the pandemic: emergence, 
confrontation, and management. In the confrontation phase especially there was a strong tendency to 
depoliticise the issue by involving experts, especially epidemiologists.  
 
50 Prymula: Epidemie vesele pokračuje, byl bych teď tvrdší, Maďar není odborník. Reflex, 8/07/2020. 
51 KSČM. See: https://www.kscm.cz/cs/aktualne/aktuality/politicky-souboj-o-uzemi-cr-se-vyhrocuje 
 
 
Thus far, the crisis has not had any significant effect on support for political parties in the Czech 
Republic.52 The three parties covered here have seen their political support left almost unchanged, 
and while there was a small but temporary increase in support for ANO and its coalition partner, on 
the whole there has been no change in the balance of power in the country. Finalising this chapter at 
the end of July 2020, we can conclude that there is no party that has yet either benefited or lost support 
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